12x FCF for a Future Multi-Bagger? Meet Uber Technologies!
Even under conservative estimates, Uber shares can easily double within three years and become a multi-bagger within 10 years.
Why not start with the conclusion… Uber is one of the most attractive long-term investment opportunities I see today. The company offers a rare combination of scale, re-accelerating growth, expanding profitability, incredible cash flows, a massive growth runway, and a valuation that still reflects far too much skepticism about the future.
Therefore, I have made Uber my #1 portfolio position – arguably my highest conviction investment for the decade ahead.
That conviction exists despite (or rather because of) the stock’s recent performance. Shares are down roughly 10% year-to-date and more than 25% from their October all-time high, even as the underlying business is truly firing on every cylinder, as evidenced by its latest results. Therefore, the disconnect between fundamentals and valuation has widened meaningfully, creating what I see as an increasingly asymmetric setup for long-term investors willing to look beyond short-term sentiment.
Uber released its fourth-quarter results last week, and they were sensational. Top-line momentum remained unabated, key operating metrics improved, and margins strengthened across the board. Here are a few facts to consider:
Monthly active users grew at the fastest rate in 3.5 years, with growth accelerating despite Uber’s already massive global scale.
Revenue growth remained above 20%, and gross bookings delivered their strongest growth in nearly three years.
Delivery posted its fastest bookings growth since the peak of the COVID-19 period.
And both EBITDA and free cash flow margins expanded year-over-year and quarter-over-quarter.
More importantly, these results reinforce the broader thesis. Uber has built a uniquely defensible, asset-light mobility and delivery platform that owns ride-hailing and food delivery demand at a global scale, a position that becomes stronger, not weaker, as the industry evolves. Its moat is rooted in network effects, unmatched geographic density, pricing power, data, and a two-sided marketplace that would be extraordinarily difficult to replicate.
Furthermore, the business is still operating in a vast and underpenetrated addressable market, with ample room to grow both its user base and usage intensity for many years to come. That long runway is increasingly evident in the numbers. Despite its massive global footprint, Uber continues to add users at an accelerating pace, while trip frequency remains well below theoretical saturation levels. Mobility and Delivery are becoming more habitual, more frequent use cases, and incremental improvements in reliability, pricing, and convenience continue to expand Uber’s relevance in everyday life. The Q4 acceleration in monthly active users is not an anomaly; it is a reminder that Uber’s growth opportunity is measured in decades, not quarters.
This still isn’t a mature business from that perspective, but it's very much a growth stock with years of compounding ahead. It has defied expectations for some time now, and I see no reason for this to stop.
This is especially relevant in the context of autonomous vehicles: Uber does not need to develop AV technology to win, and the market continues to underestimate the value of demand aggregation, routing, pricing, and customer access in an autonomous future. As autonomy scales, Uber is structurally positioned to act as the interface between fleets and riders, benefiting from lower unit costs and higher margins without assuming the capital risk. As a result, AVs are a trillion-dollar opportunity for Uber, not a threat, but I’ll delve into those details later!
Taken together, the picture is difficult to ignore. Despite clear evidence of re-accelerating growth, expanding margins, a long runway, and strengthening competitive advantages, Uber continues to be valued as if its best days are behind. That assessment remains deeply flawed; the opposite is true. Uber is a long-term platform winner that is executing at a very high level, yet the stock is still trading in what appears to be oversold, bargain territory.
From here, even under conservative assumptions, I see a credible path to the business doubling over the next three years and compounding into a multi-bagger over the next decade, not because everything needs to go right, but because the market is still materially underestimating what Uber has already become and the runway it still has ahead of it.
So far, my overarching thesis. In today’s analysis, I will break down the Uber Q4 results, reassess the perceived AV threat, or rather opportunity, in detail, and subsequently update my thesis, fair value estimate, and rating accordingly.
Without further ado, let’s delve in!
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Uber delivers one of its best quarters ever
Uber released its fourth-quarter report on February 4, and while the headline numbers were not spectacular, with a small revenue beat and an EPS miss, the underlying operational performance was exceptional. Uber reported record-high levels across key operational and financial metrics and demonstrated clear business momentum, as already highlighted above.
Let’s break down the numbers.
We’ll start with trips (completed deliveries or mobility rides), which remain the best indicator of platform health and demand momentum. Uber reported 22% YoY growth in trips, with daily trips now exceeding 40 million. Most importantly, this confirms that momentum remains strong.
Despite operating from a very large base, Uber is seeing no signs of demand weakness and continues to deliver an impressive growth profile. Trip growth was stable versus Q3 and marked the strongest performance since Q4 2023.
The primary driver of this growth remains user acquisition. In Q4, Uber delivered 18% growth in MAPCs (monthly active platform consumers), reaching a new all-time high of 202 million.
To me, this was the most impressive and telling metric in the Q4 report. This 18% growth wasn’t just strong; it was the fastest MAPC growth in 3.5 years, accelerating by another percentage point from Q3, and it came off an already massive base.
In other words, even with more than 200 million monthly active users, Uber is still accelerating user growth and has delivered its highest quarterly net additions since the post-COVID recovery. That speaks volumes about the company’s long-term runway: Uber is far from saturation, operates in a deeply underpenetrated global market, and remains in the early stages of becoming a truly ubiquitous, everyday platform.
In addition to user acquisition, usage frequency continues to improve, completing Uber’s dual growth engine. Trips per user increased 4% YoY, with management noting that frequency improved across all customer cohorts, driven by greater reliability, more affordable options, and a broader selection. Cross-platform engagement is also rising, with 40% of users now active across both Mobility and Delivery.
Uber One membership growth was another highlight, increasing 55% YoY to 46 million global members, supported by new benefits such as surprise vehicle upgrades and family sharing. This matters because Uber One members tend to be more frequent, more loyal users who engage across multiple services. As Uber One penetration rises, it creates a durable, recurring layer of demand that structurally supports higher trip frequency, stronger retention, and more predictable long-term growth.
Taken together, strong MAPC growth and steady improvements in frequency drove 22% YoY growth in trips — the strongest operational performance Uber has delivered in roughly two years. Safe to say, the platform is firing on all cylinders.
This operational momentum translated into 22% YoY growth in gross bookings to $54.1 billion in Q4. Notably, this marked the second consecutive quarter of acceleration, exceeded the high end of management’s guidance, and represented the strongest gross bookings growth in nearly three years. Growth was driven by higher trip volumes and flat per-trip pricing YoY, with management highlighting notable strength in the U.S.
On a full-year basis, gross bookings reached $194 billion, up 20% YoY, marking the fifth consecutive year of 20%+ growth, a testament to Uber’s sustained operational execution.
Finally, Q4 revenue reached $14.4 billion, up 20% YoY. Revenue grew slightly slower than gross bookings due to a modest decline in the take rate, but still exceeded consensus estimates by approximately $50 million, and growth remained stable relative to Q3.
Making up the balance so far, I am really pleased and quite impressed with these operational and top-line financial results, which are stronger than I expected.
Let’s then break down revenue by operation, starting with mobility (ride-hailing). Gross bookings in Q4 grew 19% YoY, reflecting continued stabilization after growth slowed significantly in 2025. However, this now seems stable in the 18-19% range, which is positive.
The performance was supported by a second consecutive quarter of accelerating mobility gross bookings in the U.S., where demand is recovering slightly, and by strong growth in EMEA, where gross bookings were up 30% YoY, driven by healthy category demand, category-position gains, and geographic expansion. In Europe, Uber still has a long runway, with underpenetration in many countries, so I expect momentum to remain strong as it expands its presence.
In general, a broader selection and improved accessibility remain important drivers of growth, enabling Uber to better meet the needs of more consumers. This includes offerings at different price points, such as Uber Shuttle (ride-sharing) and Uber XXXL for groups at U.S. airports.
Airports in general remain a compelling opportunity for Uber to grow its penetration. These already account for 15% of mobility gross bookings, but it still captures fewer than 10% of travelers across its top airports. However, airports such as New York City and Mexico City demonstrate that higher penetration is possible, with penetration rates of 20-40%. That is just one example of room for growth.
On the other side of the equation, Uber’s driver base also continues to strengthen. The Uber platform totaled over 9.7 million monthly drivers at the end of Q4, up 19% YoY. This allows Uber to keep driver availability optimal and driver incentives lower, protecting its take rate.
Ultimately, mobility revenue in Q4 hit $8.2 billion, up 18% YoY.
Moving to delivery, gross bookings growth accelerated strongly in Q4, growing 26% YoY to $25.4 billion, helped by a strong holiday season. As noted earlier, this was the strongest growth in delivery gross bookings since the COVID-19 peak, accelerating by another 200 bps from Q3, driven by both the U.S. and international markets.
Similar to mobility, EMEA was the fastest-growing region, driven by strong market-share gains in the UK, France, Germany, and Spain, as Uber expands its presence in these countries and outpaces rivals in growth. Globally, Uber estimates it has gained category market share in nearly every top market, outperforming competitors due to its scale and brand.
Most importantly, smaller competitors simply can’t compete with Uber’s driver base size (availability is king), advertising budget, and pricing leverage. As a result, it has been gaining market share for years, and I don’t see this changing, as its advantage only continues to grow.
Another important growth driver for delivery is Uber’s expanding presence in the grocery and retail market. Active storefronts grew 45% YoY, significantly broadening Uber’s G&R offering. It signed large retailers across the globe onto its platform. Here is a quote from management:
“… the addition of marquee partners like Loblaws in Canada, Biedronka in Poland, Seiyu in Japan, and a new multi-year exclusivity with Coles, Australia’s largest grocer. We also welcomed several notable merchants in key retail categories like beauty and personal care, pets, health, electronics, and home improvement, including Hibbett Sports, Lush, and Pacsun in the U.S.”
Two more developments that stood out to me in Q4 were an expanded partnership with OpenTable in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, the U.K., and Ireland, letting customers make restaurant reservations directly in the Uber Eats app, and a deepened relationship with Shopify, allowing merchants to embed one-hour, same-day, and scheduled delivery directly into their checkout experiences.
Food delivery, grocery delivery, direct package delivery, and restaurant reservations – Uber is gradually getting “super-app” vibes, which is important because it increases engagement, frequency, and switching costs by consolidating everyday local commerce into a single, habit-forming platform. Over time, this breadth strengthens Uber’s moat, deepens customer relationships, and reinforces its position as the default interface between consumers and local businesses.
Now, finally, beyond delivery and mobility, advertising is growing into an increasingly important growth lever for Uber as well. Advertising revenue has reached an annual run rate of over $2 billion, up 50% YoY, driven by strong adoption of Sponsored Listings, expansion of Sponsored Items on the delivery platform, and significant improvements to its advertising technology stack.
On that note, let’s move to the P&L, which was similarly impressive.
Uber delivered non-GAAP operating income of $1.9 billion, up 46% YoY. This reflects an operating margin of 13.4%, up 230 bps YoY, driven by growing operating leverage. Furthermore, GAAP operating income was $1.8 billion, up 130% YoY, driven by a strong operating performance and fewer discrete legal and regulatory-related matters.
This resulted in a strong EBITDA of $2.5 billion, up 35% YoY, reflecting a 17.4% EBITDA margin, up another 40 bps sequentially and 200 bps YoY, driven by strong top-line performance and cost discipline. The EBITDA margin in both mobility and delivery improved, growing by 100 bps and 200 bps, respectively.
Moving further down the line, Uber delivered a non-GAAP net income of $1.5 billion, up 25% YoY, translating into an EPS of $0.71, missing consensus estimates by $0.09 and up 27% YoY, benefitting from a lower share count. The slower growth in net income relative to operating income was primarily due to a higher YoY tax rate.
Finally, Uber delivered an excellent FCF of $2.8 billion in Q4, up 65% YoY. This brings the FY25 FCF to an excellent $9.8 billion, up 42% YoY and reflecting an 18.8% FCF margin, up 310 bps YoY.
This is excellent. Uber is increasingly becoming a true FCF machine, generating heaps of it every quarter. For reference, this FY25 number implies an EBITDA conversion rate of 114%, indicating significant and growing earnings power through its capital-light model.
I expect this strong growth in its FCF margin to persist in the coming years, with it likely approaching 30% by the end of the decade, given the significant room for operating leverage, especially through scale.
These strong cash flows also enabled management to opportunistically repurchase its own stock. It repurchased $1.9 billion in shares in Q4 alone, fully covered by FCF and offsetting the SBC of $1.5 billion for the year, and reducing the Uber share count by 2% YoY. And management still has $20 billion under its latest authorization, which would allow it to retire another 12% of its outstanding shares, which is brilliant. I expect Uber will maintain this high pace of repurchases as long as its share price remains depressed, which I deem an excellent use of cash, with a high ROI.
On the note of ROI, Uber’s reinvestment metrics are strong and trending in the right direction. Uber’s TTM ROE sits at 46%, up from 17% in the prior 12 months. Moreover, its ROIC has grown steadily over the past 3 years, from -12% in 2023 to 25% today.
Clearly, Uber can generate strong returns from its cash flows, which is a strong long-term signal.
Further, with FCF fully covering repurchases, Uber strengthened its balance sheet in Q4, ending the quarter with $7.6 billion in cash and $9.2 billion in equity stakes, against total debt of $13.3 billion, leaving the company in solid financial health.
In conclusion, I am very happy with this quarterly report. Uber delivered across the board, with strong business momentum, solid financials, and expanding margins. I have little to criticize about it – the company has outperformed my expectations across every metric!
Time to discuss Uber’s AV future.
The AV “threat” and opportunity broken down
I have already addressed the perceived threat posed by autonomous vehicles to Uber’s model multiple times in prior quarterly reports, and my stance and conclusion remain unchanged. If anything, the latest developments have only increased my confidence in Uber’s long-term position in an autonomous future.
Let’s break it down once more, and let’s do so in even greater detail!
So, the fear on the Street — and a key reason Uber shares have come under pressure in recent months — is that autonomous vehicles will ultimately disintermediate Uber by removing the driver from the equation. That view assumes that value in mobility accrues primarily to whoever owns the vehicle or the autonomous technology, and that AV providers will simply bypass Uber by launching their own vertically integrated consumer networks to match supply with demand.
In my view, this narrative fundamentally misunderstands where the true economic power in mobility sits and underestimates what Uber has built over decades of operation.
Building a scaled mobility network is not just about cars and artificial intelligence; it is about trust, liquidity, utilization, local density, and global reach. Uber’s real strength lies in demand aggregation, routing, pricing, payments, safety, and marketplace orchestration — capabilities that become more valuable, not less, in an autonomous world. As AVs scale, fleets will still need a platform that can reliably match riders with vehicles, manage utilization across peak and off-peak hours, optimize pricing, and deliver a seamless customer experience.
Uber is already that platform. It has been built over years of operation, with more than 200 million users globally and one of the most trusted consumer brands in mobility. This massive user base and digital infrastructure, combined with years of accumulated demand, routing, and marketplace data, is not replicated overnight, or even over many years. And that level of orchestration is critical for bringing autonomous fleets to consumers at scale.
Simply put, it doesn’t make economic sense for AV operators to invest billions in building a standalone ride-hailing platform when Uber already exists, with significantly higher utilization and instant access to more than 200 million consumers. Developing autonomous technology is already one of the most capital-intensive undertakings in the world. Layering customer acquisition, payments, trust, safety infrastructure, local operations, and regulatory compliance on top of that dramatically worsens the return profile. A standalone AV network would need to replicate Uber’s demand density city by city, while absorbing years of losses from underutilized fleets, long ETAs, and sustained promotional spend. That cost compounds quickly at a global scale.
By contrast, integrating with Uber allows AV operators to plug directly into an existing, high-utilization marketplace, monetize vehicles from day one, and scale geographically without rebuilding the consumer layer each time. When utilization is the key determinant of AV economics, choosing to bypass Uber is not just risky; it is economically irrational. According to public data, Uber’s AVs already complete roughly 30% more trips per vehicle than standalone AV platforms, a difference that materially impacts cost structures and profitability.
This is why Uber is the perfect gateway for AV companies to achieve reach, drive mass adoption, and maximize utilization. There is no way around it.
And once an AV operator plugs into Uber, the platform becomes the primary driver of utilization, revenue, and learning. Vehicles are routed more efficiently, demand is deeper and more consistent, and fleets benefit from Uber’s pricing, matching, payments, and local market intelligence. Higher utilization directly improves unit economics, which is the central constraint in autonomous mobility.
At that point, attempting to shift demand away from Uber to a proprietary app would be self-defeating. The operator would trade higher utilization and lower customer acquisition costs for fragmented demand, higher marketing spend, longer wait times, and a worse customer experience, while still maintaining the same capital-intensive fleet. In other words, leaving Uber would mean voluntarily sacrificing economic gains for theoretical control.
There is also a powerful path-dependence effect. The more AVs operate on Uber, the more the platform learns about routing, demand patterns, peak utilization, pricing elasticity, and city-level dynamics. That data advantage compounds over time, further entrenching Uber as the coordination layer. By contrast, an AV operator attempting to spin up a standalone network later would be starting from a structurally weaker position, with higher costs and inferior service quality.
So, it doesn’t make sense to bypass Uber today, and even less sense by each day that passes or with each additional trip made through the Uber platform.
From the consumer’s perspective, the logic is equally straightforward. Consumers care about availability, price, wait time, and reliability, not who owns the vehicle or wrote the software. If Uber consistently delivers an autonomous ride within minutes, with competitive pricing and a familiar, trusted interface, switching to a separate AV-only app that offers longer ETAs, patchier coverage, or worse reliability simply doesn’t make sense.
This creates a reinforcing loop: consumers stay on Uber because it offers the best experience; AV operators stay on Uber because it delivers the highest utilization; and Uber’s role as the coordination layer strengthens with each additional ride. By the time autonomous vehicles are widespread, migrating to a fragmented, inferior platform would run counter to both economic logic and consumer behavior.
In one sentence, Uber is the only economically viable way for AV operators to achieve mass-market penetration and top-tier utilization from day one, and every additional autonomous ride flowing through the platform deepens its data advantage, improves marketplace efficiency, and further entrenches Uber’s long-term moat.
Autonomous vehicles, therefore, do not undermine Uber’s model; they expand it. AVs add incremental supply to an already dense marketplace, improving reliability, shortening ETAs, lowering effective prices, and stimulating demand. Early evidence from markets such as Austin and Atlanta shows that this hybrid approach accelerates overall trip growth, benefits consumers, and coexists with, rather than displaces, human drivers.
For reference, average AV ETAs in these cities are estimated to be roughly 25% lower than those observed in other major AV markets, highlighting the reliability advantage of deploying autonomy within a large, flexible, multi-supply network.
Another highlight of Uber’s hybrid network is reliability. We have already seen recent infrastructure and weather disruptions ground AV fleets for multiple days across multiple cities in recent months. Who didn’t stop? Human drivers, making Uber’s platform the only available under any conditions. Here’s a perfect example from Uber management:
“During last week’s winter storms, we were able to seamlessly remove AVs from our network in Austin, Atlanta, and Dallas at the request of our partners, without any noticeable impact on the customer experience. That is another advantage of deploying on a hybrid network: we can manage the inevitable fits and starts in AV operations, without diluting the overall customer experience.”
This is why Uber will not be disrupted by autonomous vehicles. Instead, autonomy represents a multi-trillion-dollar opportunity that strengthens Uber’s moat and reinforces its position as the default interface for global mobility.
There’s no arguing this.
Now, of course, there are counterarguments and examples. However, those are often misleading or unrepresentative.
The San Francisco (SF) AV deployments are a prime example. In SF, many AV operators operate their own platforms with some success, so it is often cited as evidence for the Uber AV bear case. Yet, as management noted in the Q4 prepared remarks, SF is a best-case scenario for AV and a poor representation of the rest of the world, or even the U.S.
Here is how management explained it:
“SF benefits from a very tech-forward demographic, high population density, higher incomes, shorter trips, mild weather, and a more permissive AV regulatory environment. So, it’s no surprise that multiple players—Nuro, Tesla, Waymo, and Zoox, to name a few—are at varying stages of deploying AV services in the Bay Area. However, the rest of the U.S. (and the world) looks very different from San Francisco.
Elsewhere, we see more sprawling cities, a higher mix of long trips, lower average household incomes, and residents and local stakeholders who are not tech-forward by default. The regulatory environment outside of San Francisco looks quite different as well: it moves more slowly, is more fragmented, and is more cautious—balancing public safety with innovation.”
In other words, the SF model is neither representative nor informative, so don’t place undue weight on these isolated pilots.
And finally, let’s not forget that broad-based AV adoption and fully autonomous large-scale fleets are still years away. Today, Uber’s mobility business is still adding 50x the total global AV category volume, so AV is still an incredibly small piece of the pie. This will rise exponentially over the next decade, but this will take time to become meaningful.
And when it does, Uber is in the perfect spot to capture this market. By the end of 2026, management aims to facilitate AV trips in 15 cities worldwide, with roughly an even split between U.S. and international cities. And by 2029, it expects to be the largest facilitator of AV trips globally. I agree with this vision.
Uber is and will continue to invest in this opportunity. In its prepared remarks, management explained that it does this in three ways:
It supports its AV partners with capital and data to accelerate innovation.
It supports OEM partners, like Lucid and Mercedes, in scaling AV production. This includes equity investments and vehicle offtake commitments. This might seem to go against its capital-light strategy, but these are strategic investments to grow its AV network and gain an edge through partnerships that require investment. Long-term, Uber has no intention of owning the fleet and intends to remain capital-light, but in the early years, it may purchase some vehicles directly to accelerate time-to-market.
It will support infrastructure partners critical to AV deployments, such as charging infrastructure.
In line with these investment priorities, Uber recently announced a deal with German car manufacturer Mercedes and Nvidia to build a global robotaxi platform that will use Mercedes’ new S-Class, Nvidia’s autonomous driving hardware and software stack, and Uber’s ride-hailing network to offer driverless rides in major markets.
Additionally, it will be teaming up with Chinese Bidu to bring Apollo Go robotaxis to the UK, starting in London in spring 2026, and will launch robotaxis in Dubai and Abu Dhabi in partnership with WeRide.
In conclusion, I think Uber is very unlikely to be disrupted by AVs. Instead, it is more likely to open up a massive market for Uber and an opportunity to further expand and strengthen its platform.
As we enter the 2030s, I expect AVs to be an additional growth driver for Uber, improving availability and global reach and enabling it to continue growing its user base and frequency at a healthy rate, supporting a strong long-term outlook.
This only solidifies my belief that Uber is poised for strong growth and outperformance over the next 5-10 years.
With that, let’s move to the outlook!
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Outlook & Valuation
As always, let’s start with management’s guidance, which was fairly upbeat and well ahead of consensus estimates, reflecting Uber’s strong business momentum.
First, a few important reporting notes. Beginning in January 2026, Uber will transition from a merchant model to an agency model in the U.K., outside London, following a tax ruling. This will reclassify driver payments from cost of revenue to contra-revenue, mechanically reducing reported revenue and Mobility revenue margins by roughly 350 basis points in 2026. Importantly, this is purely an accounting change with no impact on underlying economics, cash flow, or profitability. Uber’s merchant model in London remains unchanged.
Separately, Uber will update its financial reporting framework starting with the Q1 earnings release. The company will replace Adjusted EBITDA with Non-GAAP Operating Income at both the consolidated and segment level, a metric that includes stock-based compensation, depreciation, and non-M&A amortization. In addition, Uber will shift from providing quarterly Adjusted EBITDA guidance to quarterly Non-GAAP EPS guidance, improving transparency and aligning its reporting more closely with mature, cash-generative platform peers.
With this in mind, Uber now guides Q1 gross bookings of $52.0 billion to $53.5 billion, representing 17% to 21% YoY growth on a constant-currency basis, which suggests a deceleration from 22% in Q4, but still comfortably beats a pre-earnings consensus of $51 billion, and reflects healthy growth.
On the bottom line, Uber now guides to a Q1 EPS of $0.65 to $0.72, up 37% YoY at the midpoint, suggesting healthy margin expansion, but it fell short of the $0.75 consensus.
For the year, Uber expects its U.S. trip and gross bookings growth to continue accelerating from 2025, driven by a healthier pricing environment, lower insurance costs, strong supply dynamics, and product innovation. This is a positive indicator for FY26 gross bookings. Additionally, management expects another year of “strong margin expansion”.
Moving to my own projections, there is clearly plenty of optimism to account for, as Uber’s operating momentum remains strong and all numbers point to a long runway of growth ahead. I expect this to translate into sustained growth through 2029, which is the furthest I am modelling at this time.
So, for 2026, I expect healthy momentum to persist. Based on trends in MAPC, frequency, and trip growth in recent quarters, as well as management’s Q1 guidance, I expect Uber to deliver 19-20% trip growth in 2026, which should translate to roughly 18% gross bookings growth and 16% revenue growth. Furthermore, margin expansion is expected to be strong, thanks to growing operating leverage, so I expect EBITDA and EPS growth of 27% and 28%, respectively, assuming an EBITDA margin of 18.5%, or roughly 170 bps of margin expansion. Finally, I anticipate an FCF margin of roughly 21%, implying an FCF of $12.6 billion.
Note that, unlike Wall Street analysts, I am using non-GAAP EPS in my forecast because it excludes the impact of its equity portfolio, providing a more accurate reflection of business performance. I expect Wall Street will shift to these accounting measures over the next few months.
Looking further ahead, I expect revenue growth to gradually moderate a bit as Uber will eventually face the rule of large numbers. However, this should firmly remain in the low-to-mid teens for revenue, and mid-teens in trips and gross bookings. Meanwhile, margins should continue to expand gradually. Currently, I am modelling a 21.5% 2029 EBITDA margin and 28% FCF margin, which should allow for a low-twenties EPS CAGR (benefitting from a lower share count), a high-teens EBITDA CAGR, and a mid-twenties FCF CAGR through 2029, resulting in FCF exceeding $20 billion from 2029 onward.
These assumptions are reflected in the financial forecast below.
That brings us to valuation, and I can safely say Uber hasn’t looked this attractive in years. Amid broader market pressure and continued fear of AV disruption, Uber shares have been oversold and underperforming in recent months, already down 8% YTD and trading 25% below an October all-time high, even as financial forecasts have only strengthened. As a result, shares now trade at bargain multiples that simply don’t reflect the strength of this business and its stellar outlook. At a current share price of $76, Uber shares trade at:
24x this year’s non-GAAP earnings.
14x this year’s EBITDA per share.
12.5x this year’s FCF per share.
Seriously? These are the kinds of cash flow multiples typically reserved for slow-growing, capital-intensive industrial businesses or companies growing at low-single digits (it actually trades at a 20% cash flow discount to the industrial median), not for a dominant, asset-light global platform that is still growing revenue at 20%, expanding margins, generating nearly $10 billion in annual free cash flow, and operating in a massive, underpenetrated addressable market.
At roughly 12–13x free cash flow, the market is effectively pricing Uber as if growth is about to roll over and competitive pressures are set to intensify, despite clear evidence to the contrary.
Put differently, Uber is being valued as a mature business at the very moment it is proving it is anything but. The company is still early in its margin-expansion journey, continues to gain market share, adds users at an accelerating pace, and extends its platform into new adjacencies, including grocery, retail, advertising, and autonomous mobility.
That disconnect between valuation and fundamentals is difficult to justify. And that mismatch is precisely what creates the opportunity here, and why I believe current levels represent bargain territory for long-term investors.
At current levels, investors are paying a below-market multiple for a business that combines platform economics, strong network effects, improving capital efficiency, and a long runway for compounding ahead. Even modest multiple normalization, let alone a re-rating toward other high-quality platform businesses, would meaningfully reprice the stock higher over time, and when combined with healthy earnings growth, the prospects for investors are brilliant.
I would argue that 20x FCF, 25x EBITDA, and 30x earnings multiples are easy to justify for Uber, all things considered. And when applying those multiples to my current FY28 financial forecast (assuming a stable share count, which is conservative), I calculate an average end-of-2028 target price of $168.
From a current share price of $76, this reflects potential annualized returns of 30%, which is pretty exceptional, sitting at over 3x the average long-term market return.
In other words, the current risk-reward is compelling, and even under conservative estimates, I see room for Uber's shares to more than double over the next three years, with the potential to become a multi-bagger within 10 years.
At these oversold levels, Uber is absolutely a no-brainer – a generational buying opportunity, in my opinion.
Rating: Strong Buy - Accumulate below $110
2028 Target Price: $168
Implied CAGR from current price: ~30%
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Do you have a copy of your valuation model or is that proprietary?
Is there a clearing event or events that the company needs to go through to prove or disprove the AV thesis?